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Abstract
We investigate a disaggregated version of the abnormal earnings growth (AEG)
model of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth (2005). The value of the ﬁrm then becomes
discounted free cash ﬂows minus initial debt. Discounted free cash ﬂows are equal
to capitalized operating earnings from the initial stock of operating assets plus the
present value of an inﬁnite sequence of growth projects, where each growth project
is valued by discounted economic value added. Suﬃcient conditions for the present
value of the free cash ﬂows to be equal to the sum of these two components are
investigated. The Gordon growth formula is found to be one special case. Another
case concerns lumpy growth projects with depreciation according to the annuity
method. We then allow for three diﬀerent interest rates, the required rate of return
on equity under all-equity ﬁnancing, the borrowing rate, and the required rate of
return on equity under partial debt ﬁnancing (the latter given by MM’s Proposition
2). In the model of Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth, these rates are the same. A ﬁrm-
level model is developed that focuses on operating earnings and free cash ﬂows with
discounting at the required rate of return under all-equity ﬁnancing. An equity-level
model is then developed that focuses on bottom-line earnings and dividends with
discounting at the required rate of return under partial debt ﬁnancing. Relationships
between the two models are explored. Dividend policy irrelevance holds only in a
limited sense for the equity-level model.
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11 Introduction and Overview
Research, teaching, and also practice in the area of ﬁnancial analysis and valuation
have been aﬀected over the last years by the abnormal earnings growth (AEG) valuation
model, proposed in Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth 2005 (from now on referred to as OJ
2005). The AEG model focuses on future earnings and earnings growth. In particular,
a parsimonious version based on next year expected earnings and expected abnormal
earnings growth in the short and the long run is promoted in OJ 2005. As the authors
put it: “In a very real sense, the core of the [AEG] model shows how the current price
depends on forward eps and their subsequent growth as captured by two dividend-policy
independent measures of eps growth” (OJ 2005, p. 350). This focus on the prediction of
earnings, rather than on the future distribution of wealth (i. e., dividends net of capital
contributions), is an attractive model feature. More precisely, there is dividend policy
irrelevance, meaning that the value of owners’ equity does not depend on parameters
relating to the choice of a particular dividend policy.
Even though the AEG model is attractive, it has the weakness that there is only one
interest rate. In other words, the required unlevered rate of return on the equity, the
borrowing rate, and the required rate of return on the equity under partial debt ﬁnancing
are all the same. The original AEG model is rather general. It is based on earnings and
dividends in a general sense, without consideration of their components. A more detailed
model that speciﬁes bottom-line earnings as operating earnings minus debt interest, and
dividend as free cash ﬂow minus interest on debt plus debt increase, brings out the need
for more than one interest rate.
This paper proceeds in two steps. First, we keep the assumption of one interest rate
but proceed with the more detailed model. The value of the ﬁrm, obtained by discounting
expected dividends, then becomes the present value of free cash ﬂows minus intial debt.
Interestingly, the present value of free cash ﬂows is equal to capitalized operating earnings
from an initial stock of operating assets plus the present value of a sequence of growth
projects, where the size of each project increases at a given growth rate. Each growth
project generates a level stream of economic value added. The value of each project can
thus be determined by discounting its economic value added. This raises the question:
Under what conditions can the value of the ﬁrm’s operations, i. e., the present value of
the free cash ﬂows, be obtained as capitalized initial operating earnings plus the present
value of an inﬁnite sequence of growth projects, with each project valued by discounting
its economic value added? The Gordon growth formula turns out to be one special case.
There is also another important class of growth projects, more realistic than the Gordon
formula, that can be handled by the AEG model: Projects where the initial investment
in property, plant and equipment (PPE) is made periodically and where depreciation
is according to the annuity method. A project of this type generates a level stream of
2economic value added. Hence, the conclusion is that the AEG model is applicable to a
wider set of steady-state situations than the Gordon formula.
In our second step, we distinguish explicitly between the required rate of return on the
equity under all-equity ﬁnancing, the borrowing rate, and the required rate of return on
the equity under partial debt ﬁnancing. One can then develop both ﬁrm-level (focused on
operating earnings and free cash ﬂows) and equity-level (focused on bottom-line earnings
and dividends) AEG models. The original AEG model can thus be generalized to a
situation where the cost of equity capital is diﬀerent from the debt rate. In a comparison
between the ﬁrm-level and equity-level models, we ﬁnd the former appealing. One possible
application of the former is for continuing value in ﬁrm valuation models such as the
discounted cash ﬂow model.
Our analysis is conditioned on the following assumptions. First, ﬁnancial borrowing
and/or lending is used to obtain variations in the dividend policy. For simplicity, from
now on we will say “borrowing” and “debt”, even though these two could be negative, i. e.,
lending and ﬁnancial assets. Second, since there is borrowing, there is a need for an explicit
borrowing rate that is diﬀerent from the discount rate. In Section 3, we follow OJ 2005 and
Ohlson and Gao 2006 (from now on abbreviated as OG 2006) in letting the borrowing rate
be the same as the discount rate. Starting in Section 5, however, there are two exogenous
interest rates, the required rate of return on the unlevered operating activities ρu,a n dr
for borrowing. Investors are assumed risk averse in the sense that ρu >r . Third, there are
no company taxes. This implies that the leverage irrelevance proposition of Modigliani
and Miller (1958) should hold. Consequently, the required rate of return under partial
debt ﬁnancing is determined in accordance with these authors’ Proposition 2. Fourth, the
clean surplus relationship holds (this assumption is not imposed in OJ 2005). This implies
that a year’s dividend is equal to free cash ﬂow minus interest on debt plus increase in
debt. For completeness, we also point out that by assumption the value of the equity is
the present value of discounted expected dividends.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we summarize the AEG model
and the meaning of dividend policy irrelevance. Section 3 considers the detailed AEG
model with one single interest rate. Suﬃcient conditions for the AEG model to be valid
are investigated in Section 4. In Section 5, we introduce the required rate of return ρu >r
on the unlevered operating activities and generalize the model from Section 3 to the ﬁrm-
level model with two exogenous interest rates ρu and r. The corresponding equity-level
model is developed in Section 6. Section 7 contains concluding remarks. A separate
appendix contains the details of some discounting operations.
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−tzt where zt =
1
r
(epst+1 + rdpst − (1 + r)epst). (1)
Equation (1) provides the share value P1 at the beginning of year 1, the date of valuation.
epst means expected bottom-line earnings per share at the end of year t and dpst the
expected dividend at the same date. zt is the capitalized increase in abnormal earnings
per share between year t and year t + 1. All variables referring to future dates should
be interpreted as expected values, but for simplicity we suppress expectation operators.
T h ed i s c o u n tr a t ei sr. Equation (1) is a simple restatement of the fact that the value of
one share is equal to the present value of future expected dividends. The interpretation
of (1) is straight-forward: The value of one share is equal to capitalized year 1 earnings
per share (the ﬁrst term) plus additional value due to abnormal cum-dividend earnings
per share growth (the second term) (cf. Penman 2007, pp. 204-206). It is stated in OG
2006 (p. 11) that zt should be viewed as a function of epst+1 and epst, even though it is
also a function of dpst. This is the non-parsimonious AEG model.
It is claimed in OJ 2005 (p. 353) that the following assumption “virtually suggests
itself”: zt+1 =( 1 + g)zt,0≤ g<r . g is apparently a growth factor. When this assumption
is made, the parsimonious AEG model is obtained. The discussion in OJ 2005 and in OG
2006 is mainly concerned with the parsimonious AEG model, as will be this paper.
The assumption that zt grows by a constant factor g implies a crucial change in model
logic: zt is no longer a function of epst+1 and epst. Instead, it is epst+1 that gets determined








Certain insights can be obtained from a somewhat more circumstantial path to the
per share value. For simplicity like in OG 2006 (p. 9), it is assumed that there is only one
share outstanding, so all variables refer to the whole ﬁrm. Changing to notation that we





xt+1 =( 1 + r)xt + rzt − rdt
zt+1 =( 1 + g)zt
dt+1 = c1xt + c2zt + c3dt
(3)
with initial (expected) values x1, z1,a n dd1. xt denotes bottom-line earnings at the end
of year t and dt the dividend at the end of the same year. The ﬁrst equation in (3) follows
4from the deﬁnition of zt. c1, c2,a n dc3 are arbitrary dividend policy parameters.1
The ﬁrst equation in (3) shows clearly the dependence of xt+1 on xt, zt and dt.S i n c e
zt is the capitalized increase in abnormal bottom-line earnings between year t and year
t +1 ,rzt is the (non-capitalized) abnormal bottom-line earnings increase between those
two years. One can interpret the ﬁrst equation as follows. Suppose that all earnings are
cash earnings. The ﬁrm has two sources of cash earnings. The ﬁrst one is a bank account
with an initial balance of x1/r (so r is the bank rate). The second one is an autonomous
project generator. The ﬁrst project is initiated at the end of year 1 and provides a level
stream of cash earnings equal to rz1 at the end of each year, starting in year 2. The second
project is initiated at the end of year 2 and provides a level stream of cash earnings equal
to rz1(1 + g) at the end of each year, starting in year 3, and so on. Total cash earnings
from these projects are hence rz1 at the end of year 2, rz1 +rz1(1+g) at the end of year
3, rz1 + rz1(1 + g)+rz1(1 + g)2 at the end of year 4, etc. At the end of year t +1 ,t h e y
are rz1
 t−1
s=0(1 + g)s = rz1
1−(1+g)t
−g , assuming g  =0 . 2 The earnings from the autonomous
project generator are abnormal, since there are no initial investments associated with each
successive project.
The ﬁrst equation apparently says that year t + 1 bottom-line cash earnings (xt+1)
are equal to year t bottom-line cash earnings (xt) plus the increase in abnormal cash
earnings between years t and t+1( rzt) plus interest on year t retained bottom-line cash
earnings (r(xt−dt)). However, a diﬀerent decomposition of xt+1, suggested in the previous
paragraph, is instructive: xt+1 is equal to the initial cash earnings x1 plus abnormal cash
earnings from the autonomous project generator rz1
1−(1+g)t
−g plus interest on cumulated
retained bottom-line cash earnings r
 t
s=1(xt − dt). Supposedly cash earnings can be
transferred at the interest rate r from one year to another by means of increasing or
decreasing the debt (or withdrawing from or adding to the bank account), or equivalently,
by means of the dividend policy. Such transfers do not create or destroy value. The value




























E1 denotes the computed value of the equity at the beginning of year 1, i. e., the time of
valuation.3 This is of course the same equity value as in (2). The previous interpretation
1The only restriction on these parameters is that c1 and c3 are such that the summation in equation
(23) in the appendix converges (c2 does not matter). This restriction holds for reasonable c1 and c3
values.
2If g =0 ,t h e nrz1
 t−1
s=0(1 + g)s = rz1(t − 1). For simplicity, this case is disregarded in subsequent
equations.
3Hence E1 corresponds to P1 above. More generally, Et denotes computed value of the equity at the
start of year t according to the valuation model.
5of the AEG model is apparently quite close to the bank account metaphor that is often
used by Ohlson (cf. Christensen and Feltham 2003, p. 287).
We know the value of the equity from (2) or (4), but the same equity value can
obviously be obtained through direct discounting of expected dividends; cf. the appendix.
It is noted that there are only four parameters in the valuation formula (4): bottom-line
earnings at the end of year 1 (x1), capitalized abnormal earnings growth between year 1
and year 2 (z1), long-term growth g, and the discount rate r. In particular, E1 does not
depend on c1, c2,a n dc3. Also, it does not depend on d1.4 Dividend policy irrelevance is
deﬁned by this independence of E1 on c1, c2, c3,a n dd1.
3 The AEG Model with Operating and Financial Ac-
tivities
The AEG model as outlined in Section 2 is not very speciﬁc about earnings. Most of
the discussion in OJ 2005 and in OG 2006 is merely about “earnings” in an unspeciﬁed
sense.5 Also, the discount rate r is simply considered as an unexplained and exogenous
cost of equity capital.
From now on, we distinguish between operating and bottom-line earnings. The diﬀer-
ence between the two is interest expense on debt. Hence, there is a need for a debt rate
that is typically not the same as the one that is used for discounting expected dividends
to a present value (cf. OG 2006 pp. 29 and 49 for brief comments in two footnotes). In
this section, however, we will nevertheless stick to the original model framework with only
one interest rate. This means that the ﬁrm’s operating and ﬁnancing activities must be
thought of as belonging to the same risk class, or that investors are risk-neutral and hence
require the same cost of capital for risky and risk-free investments.
The variables are now oxt (operating earnings), zt (still assumed to grow at the rate
g from year to year), ft (free cash ﬂow, assumed equal to k · oxt,w h e r e0<k<1), Dt
(debt), and dt (dividend). All of these variables except Dt are ﬂow variables at the end of
year t. Dt is a stock variable at the beginning of year t. It is assumed that Dt represents
a book value that is equal to market value. The current point in time is the beginning
of year 1, so all variables except D1 are expected values. The required rate of return on
the equity under all-equity ﬁnancing and the borrowing rate are the same, denoted by
r. Bottom-line earnings are oxt − rDt. By the equality of free cash ﬂow and ﬁnancial
cash ﬂow, and since the clean surplus relationship is assumed to hold, the dividend dt is
4It holds that
∂E1
∂d1 =0 ,s i n c ez1 is a given initial value.
5Exceptions to this statement are Appendix II of OJ 2005 and pp. 27-30, 61-64, and 69-71 of OG
2006.
6ft − rDt +( Dt+1 − Dt).6
From the deﬁnition of zt (cf. (1)), it follows:
rzt =( oxt+1 − rDt+1)+r(ft − rDt +( Dt+1 − Dt)) − (1 + r)(oxt − rDt), (5)
which may be simpliﬁed to
rzt = oxt+1 + rft − (1 + r)oxt. (6)
In other words, the debt terms cancel in (5). The diﬀerence equation system for this
version of the AEG model can be written as follows, using (6) for the ﬁrst equation:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
oxt+1 =( 1 + r)oxt + rzt − rft
zt+1 =( 1 + g)zt
ft+1 = k(1 + r)oxt + krzt − krft
Dt+1 = α1oxt + α2zt + α3ft + α4Dt + α5dt
dt+1 = ft+1 − rDt+1 +( Dt+2 − Dt+1)
(7)
In the fourth equation of (7), the ﬁrm’s debt policy and hence also the dividend policy
is speciﬁed by the parameters α1, α2, α3, α4,a n dα5. ox1, z1, f1 = k · ox1, D1,a n d
d1 =( f1 − (1 + r)D1 + α1ox1 + α2z1 + α3f1 + α4D1)/(1 − α5) are given initial values.
An economic interpretation of the ﬁrst equation in (7) is as follows. There are two
exogenous sources of operating earnings, an original, already existing (at the start of year
1) stock of operating assets that provides a level stream of annual operating earnings
equal to ox1 at the end of each year, plus a generator of new projects. The ﬁrst new
project is undertaken at the end of year 1 and provides a level stream of annual abnormal
operating earnings, i. e., economic value added, equal to rz1 starting at the end of year 2.
The second new project is undertaken at the end of year 2 and provides a level stream of
annual abnormal operating earnings equal to rz1(1 + g)=rz2 starting at the end of year
3, etc. These new projects will be referred to as z projects.
6The assumption that ft = k · oxt should not be interpreted to mean that the precise portion (1 − k)
of operating earnings oxt is needed for capital expenditures greater than depreciation and for additional
working capital. Rather, k expresses that fraction of operating earnings that the ﬁrm freely chooses to
pay out in the form of dividend and debt service. More precisely, and as will be seen in what follows,
the ﬁrm is committed to a geometrically increasing series of growth projects, referred to as z projects.
The initial growth project investment in year t is included in that portion of gross cash ﬂow (operating
earnings plus depreciation) that is not paid out as dividend and debt service. However, that portion of
gross cash ﬂow also comprises the initial investment in a zero-NPV operating project. The size of the
latter can be freely chosen by the ﬁrm, and in that sense k is a parameter at the ﬁrm’s discretion. In
Appendix II of OJ 2005, a more complex formulation is used, ft =[ q1 − q2(4 +
√
t)−1]oxt with q1 =0 .6,
q2 =0 .3. Our simpler assumption ft = k · oxt permits us to obtain an explicit solution to the ﬁrst three
equations of the equation system (7) (cf. the appendix).
7The present value of an ongoing project is the book value of operating net assets plus
the discounted value of economic value added. In the net present value just prior to
starting up the project, the book value of the operating net assets is cancelled by the
initial investment. This means that the value of the ﬁrst z project (at the end of year 1,
prior to making the initial investment) is (rz1)/r = z1. Similarly, the net present value of
the second z project (at the end of year 2) is (rz2)/r = z2 = z1(1 + g), etc.
The ﬁrst equation in (7) hence means that operating earnings in year t +1( oxt+1)
are equal to operating earnings in year t (oxt) plus the increase in abnormal operating
earnings between years t and t +1( rzt) plus the (normal) return on that portion of
the operating earnings in year t that was not distributed to the capital owners (debt
and equity owners) in the form of ﬁnancial cash ﬂow (r(oxt − ft)=r(1 − k)oxt,s i n c e
ft = k · oxt). The non-abnormal part of the operating earnings increase in year t + 1 due
to the z project that is undertaken at the end of year t is included in the (normal) return
on that part of the operating earnings in year t that is not distributed as ﬁnancial cash
ﬂow.
Apparently, according to the ﬁrst equation in (7), it is possible to reshuﬄe operating
earnings from one year to another at the interest rate r. So there is actually the following
implicit assumption: The ﬁrm has at its disposal a suﬃciently large set of zero-NPV
operating investment projects that can be utilized for such reshuﬄing. These zero-NPV
projects, as well as the initial investments in z projects, are ﬁnanced out of gross cash ﬂows
(or create additional gross cash ﬂows). Similarly to the alternative decomposition of xt+1
in Section 2, there is the following alternative decomposition of oxt+1:( i )T h eo r i g i n a l
operating earnings ox1, plus (ii) abnormal operating earnings from the (cumulated set
of) z projects, plus (iii) normal operating earnings on the z projects, plus (iv) operating
earnings on the (cumulated set of) zero-NPV projects. (Cf. also equation (20) in Section
6b e l o w . )
Rewriting the last equation of (7) in order to obtain variables pertaining to year t on
the right hand side, one obtains:
dt+1 =[ ft+1 − (1 + r)Dt+1 + α1oxt+1 + α2zt+1 + α3ft+1 + α4Dt+1]/(1 − α5)
=
(1 + α3)(1 + r)k + α1α4
1 − α5
oxt +




α1r +( 1+α3)rk +( 1+r − α4)α3
1 − α5
ft −
(1 + r − α4)α4
1 − α5
Dt −
(1 + r − α4)α5
1 − α5
dt. (8)









8The value of the equity is discounted free cash ﬂows minus initial debt. This follows since
the ﬁrst two terms are the present value of future free cash ﬂows (i. e., the value of the
operations), as can be shown by direct calculation (again see the appendix).
The present value of future free cash ﬂows in the AEG model is apparently independent
of the free cash ﬂows, so there is free cash ﬂow irrelevance. This follows since the parameter
k that relates free cash ﬂows to operating earnings does not enter into the formula for the
present value of the free cash ﬂows. The implication is that the present value of the free
cash ﬂows is the same when each year’s free cash ﬂow is (say) 80% of the year’s operating
earnings as when it is (say) 50% of the year’s operating earnings. At ﬁrst sight, this may
seem puzzling. However, free cash ﬂow irrelevance is quite logical in the AEG model,
if one remembers that the parameter k reshuﬄes operating earnings between years by
means of zero-NPV operating investment projects. Free cash ﬂow irrelevance is not an
assumption that we have imposed. It is inherent, although not immediately visible, in the
AEG model. Ohlson and Juettner-Nauroth recognize this when they say “... the model
builds in free cash ﬂows irrelevancy no less than dividend policy irrelevancy” (OJ 2005,
p. 363).
To be pedantic, free cash ﬂow irrelevance does not hold if ox1 or z1 depend on k.O n e
special subcase of this kind is mentioned in the appendix, i. e., when z1 = −ox1{(r(1 −
k) − g)/r}. In that situation, the present value of the free cash ﬂows is f1/(r − g)=
k · ox1/(r − g), contradicting free cash ﬂow irrelevance.
4 Conditions for the AEG Model to Hold
The value of the ﬁrm’s operations, i. e., the present value of free cash ﬂows, actually
follows directly from the previously suggested decomposition of oxt+1 into four components
and can be paraphrased as follows: Capitalized level operating earnings from the ﬁrm’s
initial stock of operating assets (ox1/r), plus the present value of an inﬁnite, geometrically





g)). zt is the net present value of the t-th z project, with initial investment at the end of
year t.E a c hz project provides a level stream of economic value added equal to rzt,s o
its net present value at the time it is initiated is (rzt)/r = zt. The last two components
of the suggested decomposition, normal operating earnings on z projects and operating
earnings on zero-NPV projects, do not provide or destroy any value and hence do not
enter into the present value of the free cash ﬂows.
The question is now: Under what conditions is the present value of the ﬁrm’s free cash
ﬂows equal to ox1/r+z1/(r−g)? To begin with, the ﬁrm must be in a steady state. This
follows from the inﬁnite nature of the capitalization and discounting operations. But there
are also rather speciﬁc conditions on earnings patterns and associated accounting rules.
9To get some feeling for those conditions, we ﬁrst consider the Gordon growth formula.
The Gordon formula is very often used in the discounted cash ﬂow model for ﬁrm
valuation to provide the continuing value at the outset of the post-horizon period (cf.
Jennergren 2007). More precisely, it is assumed that the free cash ﬂows ft in the post-
horizon period increase year by year by some growth rate g. Suppose year 1 is the ﬁrst
year of the post-horizon period. The value of the operations is then f1/(r − g). Since for
the time being we do not distinguish between diﬀerent discount rates, r is still the rate
that is valid for discounting the free cash ﬂows from the operations.
Table 1 contains a numerical example of the situation that must hold when the Gordon
formula is applied. Columns [3], [5], [6], [8], [12], and [14] contain stock variables at year
starts, the remaining columns ﬂow variables at year ends.7 Given initial values in columns
[1], [2], and [8] are indicated by underlining. The current year is year 1, and the object of
the valuation is the value of the operations at the beginning of that year. The economic
life of the PPE is 10 years, and annual depreciation is linear, i. e., 1/10 of the acquisition
value of each cohort.8 The history of the ﬁrm’s development is hence given by years −10
to 0. The assumed growth rate g is 3.02% (for instance, due to 2% inﬂation and 1%
real growth). Sales minus cash operating costs in column [1] and capital expenditures in
column [2] have apparently increased by 3.02% between years −10 and 0 and are expected
to grow at the same rate in future years. Gross PPE in column [3] is obtained by summing
capital expenditures backwards over cohorts that have not been retired. For the beginning
of year 1, it is apparently obtained as 10.3020 + 10.6131 + ... + 13.4653 = 118.2097.
Accumulated depreciation in column [5] is also obtained by summing backwards over
cohorts that have not been retired. For instance, for the beginning of year 1, accumulated
depreciation is (9/10)· 10.3020 + (8/10)·10.6131 + ... + (0/10)·13.4653 = 50.2971. Net
PPE in column [6] is gross PPE minus accumulated depreciation. Depreciation in column
[4] is equal to the year’s starting gross PPE multiplied by 1/10. Each year’s investment
in working capital in column [7] is equal to the year’s starting working capital in column
[8] multiplied by the growth rate 3.02%.
The operating earnings oxt in year t in column [9] are equal to sales minus cash
operating costs in column [1] minus depreciation in column [4]. Free cash ﬂow in column
[10] is operating earnings in column [9] plus depreciation in column [4] minus capital
expenditures in column [2] minus investment in working capital in column [7] and turns
out to be 27.4087 in year 1. Suppose the discount rate r is 10%. The value of the
7Columns in Table 1 and Table 2 (later in this section) are marked by square brackets, to distinguish
from equation numbers which are marked by parentheses.
8The Gordon growth formula being a special case of the AEG model does not depend on the de-
preciation rule. However, the value split between initial operations and growth projects changes, if the
depreciation rule changes.
10operations is then 27.4087/(0.1−0.0302) = 392.6751.
However, there is an alternative interpretation of the Gordon formula. The ﬁrm’s op-
erations are viewed as consisting of two parts, the ﬁrst one being the original operations
that provide operating earnings equal to ox1 in every single year (column [11]). In addi-
tion, the ﬁrm has an inﬁnite sequence of growth projects. In connection with the Gordon
formula, those growth projects are also referred to as Gordon projects. The ﬁrst project
is undertaken at the end of year 1 and provides an inﬁnite, level stream of operating
earnings equal to g · ox1, starting in year 2. The second project is undertaken at the end
of year 2 and provides an inﬁnite, level stream of operating earnings equal to g·ox1(1+g)
starting in year 3, etc. The sum of these inﬁnite, level streams from the growth projects
is given in column [13].
The investment in PPE that is necessary for each growth project is equal to capital
expenditures in column [2] minus depreciation in column [4]. For year 1, the investment
in PPE for the ﬁrst growth project is equal to 13.8719 − 11.8210 = 2.0510 (after Excel
rounding), which is also equal to the increase in net PPE 0.0302 · 67.9126 between the
start of year 1 and the start of year 2. Out of the total capital expenditures at the end
of year 1 of 13.8719, 11.8210 hence corresponds to maintaining the initial PPE that the
ﬁrm has already at the start of year 1 and that is necessary for sustaining the original
operating earnings of ox1. Net PPE of 2.0510 (all age cohorts) is transferred to the ﬁrst
growth project, so the initial investment in PPE for that project is 2.0510. The stocks of
PPE associated with both operating earnings streams (ox1 and the ﬁrst growth project
stream) have the same age structures. That is, the acquisition values of successive non-
retired cohorts increase in line with the assumed growth rate g.9 It is this geometrically
increasing age structure that guarantees that depreciation for the PPE associated with the
original stream ox1 is equal to capital expenditures for that stock of PPE. This observation
generalizes to later years t: Depreciation of PPE related to the original stream ox1 and to
all previously initiated growth projects is equal to capital expenditures, for each associated
stock of PPE considered separately.
Adding investment in PPE and investment in working capital, one obtains each year’s
total new investment (associated with that year’s growth project). Since depreciation
equals capital expenditures for growth projects that are already up and running, the
book value of operating net assets is always equal to cumulated total new investments
for these projects, and is given in column [14] (equal to column [2] minus column [4] plus
column [7] plus last year’s value in column [14]). Let Ot denote the book value of total
9The gross PPE that is associated with the original operating earnings at the start of year 2 is hence
(1 − 0.0302)· (10.6131 + 10.9336+ ... +1 3 .8719) = 118.2097, and the gross PPE that is associated with
the ﬁrst growth project at the start of year 2 is 0.0302· (10.6131+ 10.9336+ ... +13.8719) = 121.7797−
118.2097 = 3.5699. The corresponding net PPEs are (1−0.0302)·((1/10)·10.6131+(2/10)·10.9336+...+
(10/10)·13.8719) = 67.9126 and 0.0302·((1/10)·10.6131+(2/10)·10.9336+...+(10/10)·13.8719) = 2.0510.
11operating net assets (net PPE plus working capital) at the start of year t.T h e b o o k
value of new investment that is associated with the growth project in year t is apparently
gO1(1 + g)t−1.
The ﬁrm is hence expected to generate the perpetual, level operating earnings stream
ox1 associated with the operating assets available at the start of year 1 and the perpetual,
level operating earnings streams g·ox1(1+g)t−1 (t = 1, 2, 3, ...) that are associated with
the growth projects. These perpetual, level operating earnings streams are cash streams
(i. e., free cash ﬂows), since depreciation of the PPE that is associated with each stream
exactly matches capital expenditures necessary for maintaining that net PPE, and since
no additional working capital is necessary (since the streams are level).
The net present value of the growth project that is started in year t is evidently
(g · ox1(1 + g)t−1)/r −gO1(1 + g)t−1 =[ g · ox1(1 + g)t−1 − rgO1(1 + g)t−1]/r. The second
way of writing this net present value is recognized as discounted economic value added
and corresponds to zt in the AEG model. Summing the capitalized value of the initial
operating earnings stream ox1 and the net present values of all growth projects, the value



















which is of course equal to the Gordon formula since ox1 − gO1 is free cash ﬂow f1.A p -
parently, the Gordon formula can be interpreted as capitalized initial operating earnings
plus discounted economic value added of all growth projects. In the example in Table 1,
















0.8998 − 0.1 · 2.3861
0.1
= 392.6751.
Hence, the Gordon formula is a special case of the AEG model, with the Gordon
projects corresponding to more general z projects in the AEG model. The accounting for
PPE is rather peculiar when the Gordon formula is interpreted as a special case of the
AEG model: The stock of PPE that is associated with each Gordon project is a slice of
the total stock of PPE for the entire ﬁrm, age cohort by age cohort.
There is another important class of growth projects that can be incorporated into the
AEG model: Projects where the initial investment in PPE consists of one piece of brand
new equipment (i. e., not including all non-retired age cohorts), and where depreciation
is according to the annuity method. Such projects will be referred to here as lumpy
projects. To remind the reader of depreciation by the annuity method, suppose an initial
12investment of 1 is to be depreciated over its economic life n years. Depreciation at the
end of year i of the economic life (between 1 and n)i s
1 ×
r
1 − (1 + r)−n − r × 1 ×
1 − (1 + r)i−n−1
1 − (1 + r)−n =
r(1 + r)i−n−1
1 − (1 + r)−n,
where the ﬁrst term on the left hand side is the total annuity (interest and depreciation)
and the second term interest on the year’s starting undepreciated value. If the initial
investment in PPE is depreciated in this fashion, abnormal operating earnings are con-
stant. Repeating the initial investment in PPE in an inﬁnite chain, one hence obtains an
inﬁnite, level stream of abnormal operating earnings (the investment in working capital
is only made once).
The example in Table 2 illustrates a single lumpy project, supposed to be the ﬁrst in a
sequence of such projects, where the scale of each project is (1+g) times the predecessor.
Columns [4], [5], and [6] contain stock variables at year starts, the remaining columns
ﬂow variables at year ends. The project is initiated at the end of year 1 with an initial
investment in working capital of 6 and an initial investment in new PPE of 10. The
PPE has an economic life of 5 years, so the PPE is replaced at the end of year 6, 11, etc.
Depreciation according to the annuity method is shown in column [3]. Operating net assets
is the sum of net PPE and working capital in columns [5] and [6]. Operating earnings
in column [8] are sales minus cash operating costs in column [7] minus depreciation in
column [3]. Economic value added in column [9] is operating earnings in column [8] minus
operating net assets multiplied by the interest rate (assumed to be 10%). The important
observation is that economic value added is the same, year after year over an inﬁnite
horizon. Operating earnings are not constant over time, and neither is free cash ﬂow.
It is the annuity depreciation method that provides the level stream of economic value
added, so this particular choice of accounting principle is a precondition for the validity
of the AEG model in situations where capital expenditures for a z project are made
periodically, in big lumps.10
The present value of the project in Table 2 (at the start of year 2) is hence 0.0403/0.1.
Suppose the growth rate g is 3.02%. The present value (at the start of year 1) of the







The z projects in the AEG model can hence also be lumpy projects. If so, it is
necessary that depreciation is according to the annuity method. If not, the stream of
10It is known in the literature that the annuity depreciation method results in constant economic value
added, when a project’s cash ﬂows are level. Cf. Dutta and Reichelstein 2005, p. 549; Feltham and Ohlson
1996, p. 228.
13economic value added will not be level, meaning that the AEG model cannot be applied.
The z projects can obviously be combinations of Gordon projects and lumpy projects
(with annuity depreciation), as long as the growth rate g is the same for both project
categories.
At the end of this discussion of conditions that must hold for the (parsimonious) AEG
model to be valid, we conclude that they are restrictive. The AEG model is only valid for
steady-state settings. There are further restrictions on the accounting rules. The Gordon
growth formula is a special case of the AEG model. However, the latter is a non-trivial
extension of the former since lumpy projects can also be included in the z projects, if the
annuity depreciation method is used.11
5 The Firm-Level AEG Model with Operating and
Financial Activities and Three Diﬀerent Interest
Rates
Now let ρu denote the required rate of return on owners’ equity under the assumption
of all-equity ﬁnancing, and let r be the borrowing rate. Consistent with MM’s Proposition
2 (Modigliani and Miller 1958), the required rate of return on owners’ equity under partial
debt ﬁnancing is




where D is the market value of the debt, assumed equal to its book value, and E the
computed value of owners’ equity (i. e., the value of the equity that results from the
valuation model). These values of D and E are supposed to be valid at the beginning of
that year to which (9) is applied. In the previous sections, it was assumed that ρu = r
and hence also ρe = r.
The diﬀerence equation system (7) in the Section 3 can now be generalized in the
following manner to a situation with three diﬀerent interest rates:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
oxt+1 =( 1 + ρu)oxt + ρuzt − ρuft
zt+1 =( 1 + g)zt
ft+1 = k(1 + ρu)oxt + kρuzt − kρuft
Dt+1 = α1oxt + α2zt + α3ft + α4Dt + α5dt
dt+1 = ft+1 − rDt+1 +( Dt+2 − Dt+1)
(10)
11The zero-NPV projects that are used to reshuﬄe operating earnings between years do not pose any
particular requirements, i. e., any method of depreciation of PPE invested in such projects is permitted.
The possibility of reshuﬄing is merely an obscuring aspect of the AEG model: It greatly complicates the
diﬀerence equation structure without aﬀecting the solution value.
14ox1, z1, f1 = k·ox1, D1,a n dd1 =( f1−(1+r)D1+α1ox1+α2z1 +α3f1+α4D1)/(1−α5)
are given initial values. This equation system will be referred to as the ﬁrm-level model.
It follows from the previous discussion that the value of the operations of the ﬁrm at the
beginning of year t, i. e., the discounted value of the free cash ﬂows, is oxt/ρu+zt/(ρu−g).
The value E1 of the equity at the beginning of year 1 can be derived by discounting
expected dividends. A particular debt policy, and hence also dividend policy, is initially
assumed: Until some horizon year T, the debt policy is arbitrary. However, at the begin-
ning of year T + 1, the debt DT+1 will be repaid through a new issue of owners’ equity,
and from then on there will be no debt at all (Dt =0f o rt>T+ 1). Under the horizon








The equity value at the beginning of year T is then given by
ET =












ρu−gzT − rDT − DT




where the repayment of debt at the beginning of year T+1 is accounted for in the dividend
at the end of year T, and where the ﬁrst, second, and ﬁfth equations in (10) have been
















under the assumption that the debt DT+1 at the beginning of year T + 1 is retired
and that Dt =0f o ra l lt>T+ 1. Next, letting T →∞we obtain (11) under a
totally arbitrary dividend policy over an inﬁnite number of years. More generally, Et =
oxt/ρu +zt/(ρu −g)−Dt. As in Section 3, the value of the equity is discounted free cash
ﬂows minus initial debt.
The implication is that there is free cash ﬂow irrelevance and dividend policy irrele-
vance in the AEG model with three interest rates. This follows, since the free cash ﬂow
parameter k and the debt policy parameters α1, α2, α3, α4,a n dα5 do not enter into the
value formula (11).12
In the following section we compare bottom-line earnings as calculated from the ﬁrm-
level model with bottom-line earnings in the equity-level model (cf. equations (20) and
12The non-appearance of d1 in (11) no longer matters for dividend policy irrelevance, since d1 is
determined by α1, α2, α3, α4, α5, k, ox1, z1,a n dD1.
15(21)). For that purpose only (i. e., without aﬀecting the value of E1), the capital structure
in terms of Dt and Et should be constant over time. This means that Dt+1/(Dt+1+Et+1)=









































and α4 =0 ,α5 =0 .
6 The Equity-Level AEG Model with Bottom-Line
Earnings and the Required Return on Equity as
Discount Rate


















































































− Dt = Et. (13)
However, since we want to derive the value of owners’ equity directly, not as a residual,
we will set up an equation system corresponding to (3) in Section 2 above. We start as
follows:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
xt+1 =( 1 + ¯ ρe)xt +¯ ρez∗
t − ¯ ρedt
z∗
t+1 =( 1 + g)z∗
t
Dt+1 = α31xt + α32z∗
t + α33Dt + α34dt
dt+1 = k(xt+1 + rDt+1) − rDt+1 +( Dt+2 − Dt+1)
(14)
This equation system will be referred to as the equity-level model. In (14), the equation
for dt+1 uses ft+1 = k · oxt+1 and oxt+1 = xt+1 + rDt+1. The debt policy parameters in
the equation for Dt+1 are denoted by two indices, to emphasize that these parameters are
diﬀerent from the corresponding parameters in the fourth equations of of (7) and (10).
The required rate of return on owners’ equity ¯ ρe in (14) is constant, more precisely
that rate ¯ ρe that is implied by the initial debt D1. This means that ¯ ρe is given by






In order to maintain the constant ¯ ρe according to (15), the debt levels Dt+1 must change







































Since ox1, z1,a n dD1 are given initial values, this equation identiﬁes α31, α32,a n dα34 in
the third equation of (14). Apparently, α33 = 0. Collecting terms in the fourth equation
of (14) and using the third equation of (14) with α33 =0 ,




{(k + α31)xt+1 + α32z
∗














[(k + α31)¯ ρe +( 1+r(1 − k))α34]dt. (17)
Our equation system then consists of the ﬁrst two equations in the equity-level model (14),
i. e., the equations for xt+1 and z∗
t+1, plus (17) as equation for dt+1. The initial values are
x1 = ox1 −rD1, z∗
1 =
ρu(¯ ρe−g)




Discounting expected dividends to a present value, as in Section 2, but at the required







¯ ρe − g
. (18)
Apparently, this result is very similar to the one in Section 2, but with the required rate
of return on owners’ equity diﬀerent from the borrowing rate. One can show (although
again somewhat tediously) that successive values of xt+1, as determined through the ﬁrst
equation of the equity-level model (14), are equal to oxt+1 − rDt+1, where the oxt+1 are
determined through the ﬁrst equation of the ﬁrm-level model (10) and the Dt+1 through
(16).
Superﬁcially, there is dividend policy irrelevance, since the value of the equity accord-
ing to (18) seems independent of the debt policy parameters α31, α32, α33,a n dα34. Such
a conclusion is simplistic, however, since the requirement for a constant ρe means that
the parameters in the equation for dt+1 must be set as in (17). It is seen that α31, α32,
and α34, as well as the free cash ﬂow parameter k, enter into those parameters. Moreover,
α31, α32,a n dα34 have to be set as in (16). In fact, unless these conditions hold, the
equity-level model is not even deﬁned, since ρe is no longer constant.














− D1, where z
∗
1 =
ρu(¯ ρe − g)
¯ ρe(ρu − g)
z1, (19)
and where ¯ ρe is deﬁned by (15). The right hand side of (19), the equity value according
to the ﬁrm-level model, is totally independent of the dividend policy (and the free cash
ﬂow policy). The implication of (19) is that the equity value according to the equity-level
model, x1/¯ ρe + z∗
1/(¯ ρe − g), is valid for any dividend policy that the ﬁrm contemplates
starting in year 3, as will be seen presently. In other words, the equity-level model can
be applied by pretending that the dividend (and debt) policy of the ﬁrm is the one that
is implied by the constant required return on equity ¯ ρe. The resulting equity value is the
correct one, even if the actual dividend policy is a diﬀerent one starting in year 3.
The signiﬁcance of year 3 is the following. Suppose one wants to estimate z∗
1 from










((ox2 − rD2)+¯ ρe(k · ox1 − rD1 +( D2 − D1)) − (1 + ¯ ρe)(ox1 − rD1)).
The resulting estimated z∗
1 is not independent of the debt policy. More precisely, it is not
independent of D2, and hence not of the dividend d1 that is paid at the end of year 1.
Only when the forecasts of x2 and d1 are consistent with z∗
1 =
ρu(¯ ρe−g)
¯ ρe(ρu−g)z1, in particular
with the constant leverage ratio in years 1 and 2 that is implied by ¯ ρe, will the equity-level
model generate the same value as the ﬁrm-level model. The present diﬃculty apparently
does not arise, if ρu = r.
In summary, the equity-level model is only deﬁned for one special debt policy where
Dt/Et is constant in all years. However, the resulting equity value is the correct one and
holds for any other debt policy starting in year 3 as well. One may hence say that in a
limited sense, dividend policy irrelevance holds in the equity-level model.
One can interpret the diﬀerence between ¯ ρez∗
1 in the equity-level model (14) and ρuz1
in the ﬁrm-level model (10). Some additional notation is needed. As in Section 4, let
Ot denote the book value of total operating net assets at the beginning of year t. O1 is
hence the book value of the original operating net assets at the beginning of year 1. In
line with the interpretation of the Gordon formula in Section 4 above, depreciation of the
original operating assets corresponds exactly to capital expenditures, and there is no need
for additional working capital, so the book value of the operating net assets associated
with the level stream of operating earnings ox1 remains the same year after year.13 Ozt
denotes the book value of the operating net assets associated with the z projects at the
start of year t,a n dO0t the book value of the operating net assets associated with the
zero-NPV projects also at the start of year t. Apparently, Oz1 =0a n dO01 =0 .I tt h e n
holds that Ot = O1 + Ozt + O0t.L e t Bt denote the book equity at the start of year t.
Hence, B1 is the original book equity at the start of year 1 and Bt − B1 the increase in
book equity (equal to retained bottom-line earnings if there is no issue of shares) between
the start of year 1 and the start of year t.
Assume that the debt policy parameters α1, α2, α3, α4,a n dα5 in the ﬁrm-level model
have been set as indicated at the end of the previous section. With α31, α32, α33,a n dα34
in the equity-level model as indicated in the discussion following equation (16), bottom-
line earnings according to the ﬁrm-level model must then be the same as bottom-line
earnings in the equity-level model. Taking the components of operating earnings in the
ﬁrm-level model, bottom-line earnings xt at the end of year t can be written as
ox1 + ρuz1
1 − (1 + g)t−1
−g
+ ρu(Ozt + O0t) − rD1 − r(Dt − D1)
13If the original operating assets pertain to a lumpy project situation, then it is possible to combine
with zero-NPV projects in such a fashion that operating earnings from the original operating assets are
constant over time, with the book value of the operating net assets also remaining constant over time.
(This was not illustrated in Table 2 in Section 4.)
19= ox1 + ρuz1
1 − (1 + g)t−1
−g
+ ρu(Ot − O1) − rD1 − r(Dt − D1). (20)
Similarly, taking the components of bottom-line earnings in the equity-level model, using
x1 = ox1 − rD1, bottom-line earnings at the end of year t are also
ox1 − rD1 + ρuz1





1 − (1 + g)t−1
−g
+¯ ρe(Bt − B1). (21)
The last term in (21) is the return on retained bottom-line earnings. It is an implicit
assumption in the ﬁrm-level AEG model that bottom-line earnings can be reinvested at
the discounting rate, i. e., ¯ ρe. In other words, retained bottom-line earnings are related
to zero-NPV projects in the equity-level model, just as retained operating earnings are
related to zero-NPV projects in the ﬁrm-level model.




1 − (1 + g)t−1
−g
= ρu(Ot − O1) − ¯ ρe(Bt − B1) − r(Dt − D1).




1 − (1 + g)t−1
−g
= −(¯ ρe − ρu)(Ot − O1)+(¯ ρe − r)(Dt − D1). (22)
The diﬀerence between the earnings streams from the z projects in the ﬁrm-level model
and the z∗ projects in the equity-level model hence has to do with an inconsistency in the
way in which returns to the equity holders from retained bottom-line earnings (returns on
zero-NPV projects plus normal returns on z projects) are evaluated in the two models. In
the ﬁrm-level model, those returns are (correctly) evaluated as ρu(Ot−O1)−r(Dt −D1),
whereas in the equity-level model they are evaluated as ¯ ρe(Bt − B1)=¯ ρe(Ot − O1) −
¯ ρe(Dt − D1). This inconsistency is picked up in the diﬀerence between zt and z∗
t.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The starting point in this paper was the observation that earnings are rather general,
or generic, in the AEG model in OJ 2005 and OG 2006. Disregarding the need for
more than one interest rate, Section 3 reformulated the original AEG model to focus
on operating earnings and free cash ﬂows rather than on earnings and dividends. Even
though dividends are discounted, the equity value turns out to be discounted free cash
ﬂows minus initial debt. Moreover, the value of the free cash ﬂows is equal to capitalized
year 1 operating earnings associated with the ﬁrm’s initial stock of operating assets plus
the present value of abnormal operating earnings from a geometrically increasing sequence
of growth projects (also referred to as z projects). The question then becomes: Under
20what conditions is the value of the operations equal to the sum of these two components?
It is clear from the discussion in Section 4 that those conditions are restrictive. To begin
with, the (parsimonious) AEG model is applicable only to steady-state situations. The
Gordon growth formula is one special case, but lumpy growth projects with depreciation
of PPE by the annuity method can also be accommodated. This means that the AEG
model is a substantial generalization of the Gordon formula.
Sections 3 and 4 are concerned with the original AEG model as exposed in OJ 2005.
The only embellishments that we have furnished are the speciﬁcations of bottom-line
earnings (operating earnings minus debt interest), dividends (free cash ﬂow minus debt
interest plus debt increase), and free cash ﬂow (k times operating earnings), together
with the clean surplus principle. There is no distinction (apart from the dependence on
the clean surplus relationship) between a ﬁrm-level and an equity-level model, if there is
only one interest rate (i. e., ρu = r). The reason is that economic value added relative
to the operating assets from the z projects (in the ﬁrm-level model) is then equal to
abnormal earnings (residual income) relative to the equity from the same projects (in the
equity-level model).
The AEG model was extended in Section 5 to incorporate two exogenous interest
rates, the required unlevered rate of return on the equity, and the borrowing rate. The
required rate of return on the equity under partial debt ﬁnancing then follows from MM’s
Proposition 2. Again the value of the equity s h o w su pa sd i s c o u n t e df r e ec a s hﬂ o w sm i n u s
initial debt. Because of the focus on operating earnings and free cash ﬂows, the model in
Section 5 was referred to as ﬁrm-level. There is free cash ﬂow as well as dividend policy
irrelevance, since the equity value does not depend on the debt policy parameters α1, α2,
α3, α4,a n dα5 or the free cash ﬂow parameter k.
Section 6 derived the related equity-level model, focused on bottom-line earnings and
dividends, where the equity value is directly obtained by discounting dividends at the
required rate of return on the equity under partial debt ﬁnancing. The resulting formula
x1/¯ ρe + z∗
1/(¯ ρe − g) looks similar to the corresponding formula x1/r + z1/(r − g)f o rt h e
original AEG model. However, dividend policy irrelevance holds only in a limited sense.
The reason is that successive debt levels Dt must be set in a very particular fashion, to
ensure that the required rate of return ρe is constant over time and equal to ¯ ρe as speciﬁed
in equation (15). The discussion in Section 6 was centered on the equivalence between
the ﬁrm-level and equity-level models, in particular the relation of z∗
1 in the latter model
to z1 in the former.
The focus on predicting earnings rather than dividends (or free cash ﬂows) is an at-
tractive feature of the AEG model, as was mentioned in the introduction. The rationale
underlying the AEG model is presumably the availability of analysts’ forecasts of div-
idends and bottom-line earnings one and two years out. With such forecasts, one can
21estimate z∗
1 according to the ﬁrst equation in (14), as suggested in the previous section.
Assuming that z∗
1 increases by g from year to year, one obtains the parsimonious equity-
level AEG model. It is of course a drawback that the estimated z∗
1 depends on the dividend
policy. Also, the meaning of z∗ projects in the equity-level model is somewhat diﬀuse. As
shown in Section 6, z∗
t is diﬀerent from zt and hence reﬂects not only discounted economic
value added from the t-th growth project, but also an inconsistency in the valuation of
zero-NPV projects.
In conclusion, we are more favorably inclined towards the ﬁrm-level model. It is more
solidly based on the ﬁrm’s concrete situation, including actually existing growth projects.
Admittedly, it suﬀers from the disadvantage that analysts’ forecasts of operating earnings
and free cash ﬂows are not as readily available as forecasts of bottom-line earnings and
dividends. However, the ﬁrm-level AEG model is an interesting candidate for continuing
value in ﬁrm valuation models of the discounted cash ﬂow variety, since it provides a
compact value formula ox1/ρu+z1/(ρu−g) for the ﬁrm’s operations and yet is a substantial
extension of the Gordon growth formula. It is our ﬁnal suggestion that this could be a
worthwhile application for the AEG model.
Appendix
Discounting of expected dividends in Section 2





































E1 is equal to the last (third) element of the matrix by column vector multiplication14 (I
is the identity matrix):
1
1+r



















































































14Cf. Goldberg 1958 (p. 237) or Sydsæter et al. 2005 (p. 414) on the ﬁrst equality in (23). Cf. also Ohlson









Discounting of expected dividends in Section 3





























































01 + g 00 0
k(1 + r) kr −kr 00
α1 α2 α3 α4 α5











and β1, β2, β3, β4,a n dβ5 as given by the right hand side of (8). The value of the




























































































































α1(1 + r(1 + k)) + α3(1 + r)k + α5(1 + r)k − α1α5rk
(1 + r − α4)r(1 + r)k
,
23γ2 =
α1(1 + r)+( α2 + α3 + α5)(1 + r)k − α2α5(r − g)k
(1 + r − α4)(1 + r)(r − g)k
,
γ3 = −
α1 + α5(1 + α3)k








(1 + r − α4)(1 + r)
.



















































Discounting of free cash ﬂows in Section 3

















01 + g 0
















There are two cases, g  = r(1 − k)a n dg = r(1 − k).
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24where the ﬁrst matrix after the ﬁrst equality sign is composed of eigenvectors (columns),
the second matrix contains eigenvalues on the diagonal, and the third matrix is the inverse
of the eigenvector matrix.15 Taking the third component of the matrix by column vector
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k(1 + r(1 − k))
t−1 − z1
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r(1 − k) − g
k(1 + g)
t−1. (25)
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As a special subcase of the ﬁrst case g  = r(1−k), suppose that z1 = −ox1{(r(1−k)−g)/r}.
Then ft = k · ox1(1 + g)t−1 = f1(1 + g)t−1, and the present value of free cash ﬂows is
k · ox1/(r − g)=f1/(r − g).






01 + r(1 − k)0
























(1 + r(1 − k))t−1 (t − 1)(1 + r(1 − k))t−2 0


























1+r(1−k)(1 + r(1 − k))t−1 r(t − 1)(1 + r(1 − k))t−2 −r
1+r(1−k)(1 + r(1 − k))t−1
0( 1 + r(1 − k))t−1 0
1+r
1+r(1−k)k(1 + r(1 − k))t−1 kr(t − 1)(1 + r(1 − k))t−2 −r





Again taking the third component of (24) to obtain the year’s free cash ﬂow, one obtains
ft = ox1k(1 + r(1 − k))
t−1 + z1kr(t − 1)(1 + r(1 − k))
t−2. (26)




ox1k(1 + r(1 − k))
t−1 + z1kr(t − 1)(1 + r(1 − k))
t−2
  1













since kr = r − g.
15Cf. Goldberg 1958 (for instance) on the solution to a system of homogeneous linear diﬀerence equa-
tions with constant coeﬃcients.
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27Table 2. Example of lumpy project
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
Accu- Sales
Capital Investment mulated minus cash Economic 
expendi- in working Depre- depre- Working  operating Operating value
Year tures capital ciation ciation Net PPE capital costs earnings added
1 10.0000 6.0000
2 1.8097 0.0000 10.0000 6.0000 2.6500 0.8403 0.0403
3 1.9002 1.8097 8.1903 6.0000 2.6500 0.7498 0.0403
4 1.9952 3.7100 6.2900 6.0000 2.6500 0.6548 0.0403
5 2.0950 5.7052 4.2948 6.0000 2.6500 0.5550 0.0403
6 10.0000 2.1998 7.8002 2.1998 6.0000 2.6500 0.4502 0.0403
7 1.8097 0.0000 10.0000 6.0000 2.6500 0.8403 0.0403
8 1.9002 1.8097 8.1903 6.0000 2.6500 0.7498 0.0403
9 1.9952 3.7100 6.2900 6.0000 2.6500 0.6548 0.0403
10 2.0950 5.7052 4.2948 6.0000 2.6500 0.5550 0.0403
11 10.0000 2.1998 7.8002 2.1998 6.0000 2.6500 0.4502 0.0403
28